THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER,
RACE AND PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
IN NEW JERSEY: THE VIEW FROM
THE BACK OF THE BUSt
DaleJones*
On July 1, 1967, the NewJersey Legislature, in response to the
call of Gideon's Trumpet, created the Office of the Public Defender (OPD). The comprehensive statutory scheme permitted,
over the course of several years, the establishment of what is essentially New Jersey's largest criminal defense firm with regional trial
offices in each county and a central appellate office, which prosecutes all appeals regardless of the county of origin. Thus, when the
death penalty was reenacted on August 6, 1982, the OPD had been
providing legal representation for indigent criminal defendants for
more than fifteen years. Having this substantial infrastructure in
place enhanced the ability of the OPD to raise and litigate systemic
issues, particularly those involving racial bias, which otherwise
would not, or could not be raised by criminal defendants who did
not have the resources to perform statewide information-gathering, storing, and retrieving as did the OPD. The ability of the OPD
to perform these tasks featured prominently in the development of
proportionality review in New Jersey not only with respect to the
collection of data, but with its interpretation as well.
The OPD correctly anticipated that the application of the
death penalty in New Jersey would fall prey to the same sort of
problem which had always been attendant to capital case processing in the United States: racial bias. In order to be prepared to
t This article was delivered by the author as part of the Seton Hall Law Review's
Symposium on Capital Punishment, on November 2, 1995.
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litigate those issues in an objective manner, the OPD, shortly after
reenactment in 1982, began to collect data on the homicide cases
assigned to it. As counsel to the vast majority of persons charged
with homicide in New Jersey, the OPD obtained a large and comprehensive set of data that would permit the analysis of capital case
processing from arrest to disposition. Two reports described in detail the efforts of the OPD. 1
The OPD also aggressively pursued issues of racial bias in its
individual death penalty cases from the outset. In State v. Ramseur,2
for example, the OPD, in challenging the jury selection process in
Essex County, demonstrated a 14.1% absolute disparity in the representation of blacks in the Essex County jury lists. The comparative disparity was 39.3%. This meant that any white had an
approximately 40% greater chance than any black of being selected as ajuror. Regrettably, the court concluded that the statistical evidence was "not so alarming as to compel a conclusion of
substantial underrepresentation." s Although this finding was disheartening, in response to the OPD's facial challenge to the consitutionality of the death penalty on the grounds that it inherently
discriminates on the basis of race, the court assured the people of
New Jersey that it "will receive any evidence on this issue and...
will, in addition, attempt
to monitor the racial aspects of the appli4
Act."
the
of
cation
Subsequently, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in pursuing its
statutory obligation to conduct proportionality review, acted on
two occasions in a manner comforting to those who were troubled
by issues of racial bias: On July 29, 1988, the court appointed Professor David C. Baldus of the University of Iowa Law School as Special Master to assist the court in developing a system for
proportionality review; and on July 24, 1990, the court declined to
determine in advance the appropriate "universe" of cases against
which to compare challenged death sentences in order to assure
proportionality.
The first event ensured that the framework for New Jersey's
B.

THE REIMPOSITION OF CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT IN NEW
1982-1986 PRELIMINARY REPORT, (1987) (unpublished)
(detailing the efforts of the OPD); LEIGH B. BENENN, ET AL., THE RErMPOSMON OF
CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT IN NEW JERSEY. INTERIM REPORT, PARTS I & II (1988) (unpublished) (same). These data were later supplied to the New Jersey Supreme Court and
integrated into the data base which supports the proportionality review project.
2 106 NJ. 123, 524 A.2d 188 (1987).
3 Id. at 223, 524 A.2d at 238.
4 Id. at 182, 524 A.2d at 216 (emphasis added).
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proportionality review would be constructed by the person most
able and most qualified to do so. The latter ensured that, at least
prior to the completion of the project, no artificial impediments
would hinder the assembly of the data needed to meaningfully answer the question of whether or not the application of the death
penalty had been tainted by racial bias.
A motion to restrict the size of the universe had been filed by
the Attorney General, who contended that the only appropriate
universe is one comprised exclusively of cases in which a death sentence has been imposed. The importance of the size of the proportionality universe of cases cannot be overstated. Justice
Handler, dissenting in State v. Marshall,5 succinctly described the
problem with such a restricted universe: "If one looks only at
death-sentenced cases, one cannot know if a particular death sentence is aberrational, one cannot know if it is disproportionate."'
By way of further explanation, Justice Handler then quoted a restatement of the problem of using a restricted universe in proportionality review made by the Nebraska Supreme Court:
If one wants to determine whether individuals are being discriminated against in public transportation, one does not merely
look at those who are required to sit in the back of the bus and
conclude that since everyone in the back of the bus looks alike,
there is no discrimination. One, of necessity, must look at who
is riding in the front of the bus as well in order to determine
whether the persons in the back are being discriminated
against. So, too, there is no way that we can determine whether
those who are sentenced to death are being discriminated
against if we do not examine those cases having the same or
similar circumstances which, for whatever
reason, did not result
7
in the imposition of a death sentence.
The ultimate resolution of the size of the universe question,
on state constitutional grounds, remains to be seen but the import
of the problem is abundantly clear: if the restricted universe imposed by the Legislature at the behest of the Attorney General is
employed in proportionality review, the ability to effectively litigate
issues of racial bias in the application of the death penalty will be
foreclosed. This, of course, was particularly distressing in light of
the preliminary findings of Special Master Baldus as reported to
5 130 NJ. 109, 613 A.2d 1059 (1992).
6 Id. at 250, 613 A.2d at 1130 (HandlerJ., dissenting).
7 Id. at 250-51, 613 A.2d at 1130-31 (Handler, J., dissenting) (quoting State v.
Palmer, 399 N.W.2d 706, 752 (1986) (Krivosha, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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the New Jersey Supreme Court in his Final Report.'
The Special Master reported that "[o]ur analysis of the penalty-trial sentencing decisions suggest that black offenders may be
at a greater risk of receiving a death sentence than similarly situated white and Hispanic defendants."9 He characterized his results
as "strictly preliminary," but only " [ b] ecause discrimination was not
the primary mandate in this project."' ° Further, he suggested that
" [m]ore work will be required to determine if [race effects] persist
under close scrutiny and alternative analyses, to determine, for example, whether they are statistical artifacts or flukes, and to assess
their legal and practical significance." 1 With that caveat in mind,
let us review what the data revealed.
The effect of racial bias in capital sentencing is demonstrated
in Table 18 of the Final Report
The data in table 18 suggest that, on average, after controlling
for the aggravation level of the cases, black defendants may have

19-percentage-point higher risk (p=0.0001) of receiving a death
sentence than do other defendants.
When penalty-trial death-sentencing rates are examined with reference to culpability level, the findings are stunning and should have
shocked the conscience of the court. At the midrange of aggravation level, culpability level four, there is a 64% higher risk that a
black defendant will be sentenced to death than any other defendant. Stated somewhat differently, in cases where a defendant has a
culpability level of four, it is nearly four times (.87/.23=3.78) as
likely that a black defendant will be sentenced to death than any
other defendant. Similarly, at culpability level three, no nonblack
defendant has been sentenced to death, although three of ten
black defendants received death sentences.
This data graphically demonstrates that it is only when juries
are not faced with obvious decisions (the easiest decisions being in
the least culpable and most culpable cases), that racial effects are
produced. When cases are at the highest level of aggravation, culpability level five, no racial effects appear; in fact, all defendants at
level five (twenty-five of twenty-five) were sentenced to death. Similarly, in the least aggravated cases (culpability levels one and two),
none of the forty-eight defendants was sentenced to death. When
8 DAVID C. BALDUs, DEATH PENALTY PROPORTIONALITY REVIEw PRoJEcT: FINAL REPORT TO THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT (1991).
9 Id. at 101.
10 Id.

I Id.
12 Id. at

102.
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juries are faced with the real choices-which of necessity arise in
mid-range cases (culpability levels three and four) where the most
discretion must be exercised-the racial effects, as noted above,
are striking. Thus, when New Jersey juries do have the latitude to
exercise discretion, they do so in a manner which is impermissibly
influenced by race.
Perhaps the most compelling way to state the problem posed
by the FinalReport is to transpose and paraphrase into a New Jersey
setting the example used by Justice Brennan in his dissent in McCleskey v. Kemp13 to characterize the plight of black defendant Warren McCleskey. At some point in the near future, a black
defendant facing capital prosecution in New Jersey will ask his
counsel whether a jury is likely to sentence him to die. A candid
reply to this question will be disturbing. First, counsel would have
to tell him that few details of the crime were more important than
the fact that he was black. Furthermore, counsel would feel bound
to tell him that if his conduct were of average culpability, he has
nearly four times the risk of being sentenced to death than a nonblack defendant. In addition, frankness would compel the disclosure that it was more likely than not that his race would determine
whether he received the death sentence. The story could be told
in a variety of ways, but a black defendant could not fail to grasp its
essential narrative line: There is a significant chance that his race
will play a prominent role in determinining whether he lives or
dies.
Nor is racial bias in capital prosecutions, according to the Final Report, solely a function of the race of the defendant. "The date
[sic] in table 18A suggest that on average, cases with a white victim
may have a 14 percentage point or higher risk of advancing to penalty trial than do other cases."" As with the previously reported
race-of-defendant disparities, racial effects appear to be strongest at
the mid-range culpability levels. Thus, at culpability level four,
white victim cases are 1.4 (.78/.56) times more likely to advance to
a penalty trial than other cases. 1 5 At culpability level three, white
victim cases are 3.4 (.67/.20) times more likely to advance to a penalty trial than other cases. 6
Justice Brennan's dissent in McCleskey also suggests another
13
14
15

481 U.S. 279, 321 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Baldus, supra note 8, at 103.
Id. at Table 18A.

16 Id.
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striking way to view these findings: 17 With respect to the race-ofthe defendant disparities expressed in Table 18, if black defendants were sentenced to death at the same rate as other defendants,
0.26 instead of the higher rate of 0.38, only fourteen blacks (55 x
0.26) would have been sentenced to death instead of twenty-one.
Thus, it is likely that seven persons (one-third of all blacks sentenced to death) were sentenced to death in New Jersey simply because they were black. Similarly, with respect to the race-of-thevictim disparities reported in Table 18A, if white-victim cases advanced to a penalty trial at the same rate as cases involving other
victims, 0.41 instead of the higher rate of 0.64, only forty-four persons (108 x 0.41) who killed white victims would have advanced to
a penalty trial instead of seventy. Thus, it is likely that twenty-seven
cases (one out of nine cases that went to penalty trial) advanced to
a penalty trial in New Jersey simply because the victims were white.
In Marshalland subsequent cases, the court continued to decry the available data. In State v. Bey, 18 with forty additional cases in
the universe and similar analytical results, the court contended
that:
Our abiding problem with analyzing the effect of race is that the
case universe still contains too few cases to prove that the race of
a defendant improperly influences death sentencing .... The
inescapable fact is that we lack enough cases to conclude with
any degree of statistical reliability whether race is working impermissibly in death sentencing ....
As vexing as waiting for
more data may be, we have no alternative but to wait.1"
The court has continued to wait and in State v. Martini and
State v. Di Frisco gave short shrift to the issue of racial bias disposing
of the issue by referring to its previous considerations in MarshallII
and Bey IV
Justice Handler, dissenting in Bey IV, has appropriately chastised the court for its approach in analyzing racial bias:
[T]he Court exhibits both an uncharacteristic timidity in light
of its oft-stated judicial obligation to confront the possibility of
invidious racial discrimination and an unwillingness to examine
rigorously arguments that credibly and cogently present that
possibility .... The inescapable fact remains that all the statistical analyses in this case are disadvantaged by under-sized data
pools and consequently large margins for error .... Now confronted by evidence of racial bias, the Court quibbles with methSee McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 325.
18 137 NJ. 334, 388-94, 645 A.2d 685, 712, 714 (1994).
19 Id. at 388, 394, 645 A.2d at 712, 714.
17
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odology and evinces an almost reactionary distrust of statistics
....

The Court suffers under the delusion that serious consider-

ation of allegations [of systematic racial discrimination] can be
continually postponed. 20 Time will eventually run out, as it did
for Warren McCleskey.
On January 11, 1996, however, when the New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) released and updated appendices and tables for proportionality review in conjunction with the
case of State v. Harris,2 1 Justice Handler's observations acquired
greater urgency. David Weisburd, the expert retained by the AOC
to analyze the most recent data, observed that:
[W]ith the Harris case, a new set of circumstances has arisen
which raises renewed questions regarding prejudicial factors in
death sentencing in NewJersey. First, the increased sample size
available for the Harris analyses has allowed convergence of
models that include the prejudicial factors. Second, both race
and the revised high status factor ...

achieve statistical signifi-

cance in specific schedules provided to the court.2 2
The import of these latest findings is threefold. First, with
thirty-two new cases in the database, a more appropriate statistical
procedure could be utilized, thus ensuring stability and greater reliability. Second, the noted race effects in cases where the defendant is black and in cases where the victim is of high socio-economic
status (SES) is not a mere statistical artifact. Finally, the race effects are statistically significant only in the analysis of penalty trial
cases.
Certainly, any reliable analyses which suggest that the death
penalty in New Jersey is being applied in a biased manner when a
defendant is black and the victim is of high SES should disconcert
anyone interested in the evenhanded administration of justice,
whether they favor the death penalty or not. But, what is more
troubling is the point in the process where that discrimination is
taking place: the death penalty trial. The clear implication is that
it is jurors, the so-called "conscience of the community," who are
demonstrating bias.
Justice Brennan's dissent in McCleskey cogently and succinctly
stated the case for the analysis and principles that the New Jersey
Supreme Court should apply and adopt.3 First, proof of the influId. at 424-26, 645 A.2d at 730-31.
141 N.J. 525, 662 A.2d 333 (1995).
State v. Harris: ProportionalityReview, Memo from David Weisburd to John P. McCarthy, Jr., Dec. 20, 1995, at Table 11.
23 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 321-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20
21
22
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ence of race on any particular sentencing decision is irrelevant in
evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim-it is the risk of the imposition of an arbitrary sentence, rather than the proven fact of one,
which invalidates the system. Second, the emphasis on risk analysis
reflects the fact that the concern for arbitrariness focuses on the
rationality of the system as a whole and that a system that features a
significant probability that charging and sentencing decisions are
influenced by impermissible considerations cannot be regarded as
rational. Third, when a pattern of arbitrary charging and sentencing outcomes has been identified, a defendant runs a corresponding risk of being sentenced arbitrarily. Thus, it is immaterial
whether the operation of an impermissible influence such as race
is intentional.
Although the Equal Protection Clause forbids racial discrimination and may require proof of an intentional violation, it is the
existence of arbitrariness, not the reason arbitrariness exists, that is
critical in Eighth Amendment analysis. That two constitutional
provisions proscribe the same evil does not mean that the Eighth
Amendment is superseded by the other. Thus, even though a viable equal protection claim may also exist, intentional racial discrimination need not be demonstrated to establish an Eighth
Amendment claim. Justice Brennan broke no new ground in adducing these principles; all are drawn directly from these cases
which have been the bedrock of capital litigation for the past two
decades. 4
The New Jersey Supreme Court has concluded that the state
constitution provides a more expansive source of protection
against the arbitrary and nonindividualized imposition of the
death penalty than the federal constitution and, therefore, it
should have no difficulty embracing the analysis and principles
stated above. Application of these principles in conjunction with
the data now available to the court demonstrates that New Jersey's
capital prosecution scheme is applied in such a manner that there
is a significant risk that the impermissible consideration of race has
infected the charging and sentencing decisions made thereunder,
and is therefore, by any standard, unconstitutional.

24 See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420
(1980); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972).

